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With significant international changes taking place and elections of global
importance on the horizon, the need for discussing regulation as a means of
confronting and ameliorating the effects of the global financial crisis of these past
few years is now as pressing as ever. In this paper, we address the question of
whether resolution of the current economic challenges should be resolved with
increased intervention on the part of the public sector or whether the markets
themselves should be entrusted with the task of spontaneously bringing solutions
to existing difficulties. The question echoes a dilemma to which a significant part
of the legal and economic literature about economic activities in contemporary
scholarship has been dedicated, viz., whether public authorities can be trusted to
resolve economic difficulties and to what extent it is appropriate to curb market
freedom in a context of unprecedented economic growth due to the energy
deployed by market actors.
The purpose of this Article is not to provide a definitive answer to the
dilemma-supposing it will ever be possible to do so. It is rather to shed some
light on the respective roles of markets and regulation authorities. In formulating
the question thus, we can also inquire into the consequences of those roles.
Competition and consumer laws are areas of law where regulation plays a
marked role in economic activity. These areas of law can be our guides as we
navigate the important question posed herein.
This Article considers the meaning of regulation in its many facets and
features, with consideration given not only to how regulation in general operates
as a tool to induce and deter certain behaviors, but also with respect to the
regulatory goals of the markets in which regulatory regimes operate. Rather,
however, than getting tied down in the minutiae of this or that regulatory regime,
instead this Article paints with a broad brush across topics of general interest,
posing as many questions as it answers.
I. A TOOL FOR ACTION
A.

General Meaning

In general, the term "regulation" means an action undertaken by a public
authority and involving the adoption of rules.' For instance, governments and
1. On regulation in general, see

STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM

(1982). See generally

ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS (1971); see also generally
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authorities around the globe have been reported, since the beginning of the
present crisis, to be considering a better and possibly farther reaching regulation
of financial activities to avoid the reiteration of the economic difficulties
currently being experienced. 2 Those difficulties have affected billions of firms,
families, and individuals, and are the result of practices perceived by many to be
unacceptable, or at least undesirable, in the light of the consequences they have
produced.
Where government regulators announce their intention to better and further
regulate financial activities, they indicate, in substance, a desire to adopt
normative rules, having a mandatory force, in the governance of the markets. But
within each legal system, regulators must take into consideration not only the
desirability (or lack thereof) of economic consequences, but also the reality of the
market activity those legal systems govern. That will necessarily mean
consideration of stakeholders involved and require consideration of the
consumer, the seller, and the government, as each in its own way is a market
actor.
In this sense, the meaning attributed to the concept of "regulation" is
considerably vast. It encompasses all public activities giving rise to the adoption
of rules-whatever the form of these rules and whatever the identity of the
authority concerned, whether it be government, administration, independent
agency, local authority, private attorneys' general, etc.
B. Specific Meaning
Parallel to the general meaning given to "regulation," another, more specific
meaning is sometimes attributed to the concept in the context of antitrust, or
competition law.' As appears from scholarship and applicable rules, this area of

MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL J. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION (1985); see also generally ANTHONY
OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY (Hart Publishing 2004) (1994); see also generally

Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); see also generally
CORPORATE CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY: CHANGING STRUCTURES AND THE DYNAMICS OF REGULATION

(Joseph McCahery, Sol Picciotto, & Colin Scott eds., 1993); see also generally Paul Nihoul, Norme, rdgulation
et reforme des tdidcommunications, 58 ANNALES DE DROIT DE LOUVAIN no. 4, 1998, at 390; George J. Stigler,
The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971); W. KIP VISCUSI, JOHN M.
VERNON & JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST (3rd ed. 2000).
2. See generally ELIE COHEN, PENSER LA CRISE (2011); see also generally PAUL KRUGMAN, THE
RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 2008 (2009).

3. These two terms are used indifferently in this paper. The former is generally used in the United States,
the latter in the European Union. On the similarities and differences between European and U.S. antitrust laws,
see generally EUGLNE BUTTIGIEG, COMPETITION LAW: SAFEGUARDING THE CONSUMER INTEREST (2009);
COMPETITION POLICY IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM (Clifford A. Jones & Mitsuo Matsushita eds., 2002);
EINER ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS (2007). See also the books

published annually by the B. Hawk and the Fordham Corporate Law Institute on specific topics considered from
the perspective of E.U./U.S. antitrust rules as well as the books published in the International Competition Law
Series at Kluwer, Series director: Alastair Sutton.
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the law is governed by the general representation that, in normal circumstances,
markets should operate freely from public interventions, with intervention
reserved where necessary to avoid distortions. The public benefits in that sort of
environment.'
As an exception to that general rule, antitrust theory provides broadly that
intervention in the freely operating market becomes necessary when adverse
consequences would otherwise result, the typical but far from exclusive examples
being where restrictive practices or abuse of a dominant position result in market
distortions. The decision that outcomes are or are not satisfactory may be based
on a variety of criteria, and is generally made by a court or other public authority
(e.g., trade commission). Sometimes a deal that looks good to one or more parties
may not be good for the market as a whole. After all, looks can be deceiving.
One reason commonly designated in antitrust theory to explain these relatively
"deceiving" outcomes is the existence of excessive market power, held by one or
several undertakings.! In such situations, the theory states that an intervention on
the part of a court or other authority may be warranted." That intervention, if any,
should have as its purpose the "containment" of the powerful firm(s) to prevent
the firm(s) from using its market power to foreclose competitors, thereby creating
a situation where goods and services are proposed at conditions less favourable
than those that can be found in competitive markets. In general, the intervention
would only take place where it can be established that the "containment" would
not be provided by the markets operating by themselves, without any
intervention.
If the intervention were to take place, it would be carried out in the name of
antitrust'o legislation and should be distinguished from another type of
intervention, called "regulation" on markets which, by their nature, do not

4.

See generally GIORGIO MoNTI, EC COMPETITION LAW (2007).

5. Id.
6. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 101-02, Mar. 30,
2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. TFEU Articles 101 and 102, as well as similar provisions in the
Sherman Antitrust Act, provide the starting point for regulatory regimes of a complex nature developed to avoid
market distortions. Id.; see also Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2004). See generally RICHARD A.
POSNER, NATURAL MONOPOLY AND ITS REGULATION (1999).

7. See generally POSNER, supra note 6; see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market
Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REv. 937, 937-38 (1981).
8. Frank H. Easterbrook, ComparativeAdvantage and Antitrust Law, 75 CAL. L. REv. 983, 983 (1987).
9. See Thomas E. Kauper, The Sullivan Approach to Horizontal Restraints, 75 CAL. L. REV. 893, 901
(1987).
10. On antitrust in general, see (in the United States): PHILIPP AREEDA & LOUIs KAPLOW, ANTITRUST
ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES (4th ed. 1998). See generally ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN,
ANTITRUST ECONOMICS (2008); see also generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001); see
also generally VISCUSI, VERNON & HARRINGTON, supra note 1. In the E.U., see generally MASSIMO MOTTA,
COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE (2004); see also generally JOANNA GOYDER & ALBERTINA
ALBORS-LLORENS, EC COMPETITION LAW (5th ed. 2009).
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support the simultaneous activity by several firms operating in competition with
one another (i.e., a "natural monopoly")."
Natural monopolies arise where the costs of providing a good or service to
the consumer would be higher if several firms were operating in the same sector
than would be the case if only one firm was permitted to operate there.12 That is
the case, specifically, where, for their exercise, activities require significant
investment in infrastructure and, until relatively recently, telecommunications.
In such markets, the presence of several undertakings would involve, for each of
them, significant entry costs which would have to translate into higher prices to
clients or consumers.14 Where the purpose is to achieve low prices for consumers,
it may be deemed preferable to limit the number of undertakings admitted in that
market to only one.
In a monopoly situation, there is a risk that it may not provide clients with
conditions analogous to those existing on normal, competitive markets. A
"surveillance" is then considered useful and even necessary.' The purpose of the
surveillance is to protect clients against abuses that may be committed by the
undertaking in the monopoly situation. 6 That "surveillance," and the
interventions on the part of courts and authorities that may derive from it, is
called, in most instances, "regulation."

11. See STANFORD V. BERG & JOHN TSCHIRHART, NATURAL MONOPOLY REGULATION: PRINCIPLES
AND PRACTICE 307-08 (1988); see also KAHN, supra note 1, at 1-14; see also POSNER, supra note 6, at 1-3; see
also VISCUSI, VERNON & HARRINGTON, supranote 1, at 2-5.
12.

See POSNER, supra note 6, at 1.

13.

See generally E.C. COMPETITION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW (Christian Koenig, Andreas

Bartosch & Jons-Daniel Braun eds., 2002).
14. See id.
15. CTR. FOR CO-OPERATION WITH THE ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION, PRIVATISATION OF UTILITIES AND
INFRASTRUCTURE: METHODS AND CONSTRAINTS 30 (1997).
16. Id. Surveillance may be carried out by various actors depending on what jurisdiction is competent. In
some cases, the task to monitor regulated markets is entrusted to independent agencies. That is the case, for
instance, in the United States, for the electricity sector and for electronic communications markets. See supra

note 3. The same goes for the European Union. See generally EUGENE D. CROSS, ELECTRIC UTILITY
REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A COUNTRY BY COUNTRY GUIDE (1996); see also generally PAUL
NIHOUL & PETER RODFORD, EU ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS LAW: COMPETITION AND REGULATION IN THE
EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET (2004). Sector specific agencies sometimes act on the basis of

their own initiatives. In other situations, the call for action may come from unsatisfied customers and/or
competitors which, depending on applicable law, may have an independent right of action allowing them to
bring the issue to court. In regulated sectors, a question is often whether and to what extent the general rules of
competition remain applicable despite the existence of sector specific regulation.
17. See generally E.C. COMPETITION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW, supra note 13.

429

2012 / The Roles Devoted to Markets and Authorities in Times of Crisis
C. Other Tools
With these two meanings," regulation constitutes one tool for authorities to
realize objectives." Other tools are available, depending on the country or
continent where the regulation is envisaged. For instance, European states used to
carry out, themselves, economic activities where, for some reason, they did not
want these activities to be carried out by private firms. Typically, these activities
would involve heavy infrastructure investment 20 or the establishment of solidarity
among classes of the population.2 1 Depending on the situation, an administration
would be entrusted with the task of carrying out the activity. 22 Alternatively, the
activity would be entrusted to an undertaking whose capital would be detained by
an authority, i.e., a "public undertaking." The activities would then be carried out
by that undertaking under direct control of the administration or Minister in
charge.23
In these two types of situations, the tools available to authorities would not
consist of formal rules. As they carried out economic activities through their own

18. Adoption of rules by authorities in general and adoption of specific rules in natural monopoly
situations.
19. Classically, authorities are represented as having objectives they seek to realize. The identity of these
objectives depends on a variety of factors. One of them is the procedure whereby the directors of these
authorities are designated. Where that designation is based, directly or indirectly, on elections, the objectives to
be realized depend upon the ideas defended by the political party(ies) winning the election. Another factor
influencing objectives pursued by authorities is the margin for manoeuvre possibly left to them to determine
what should be done in given circumstances. For instance, European competition law is based on treaty
provisions unanimously adopted by Heads of States and Governments. Antitrust: Overview, EUR. COMM'N,
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/overview en.html (last updated Mar. 16, 2012). Among these
provisions, Article 101 of the Treaty on the European Union states that anticompetitive agreements may only be
accepted where, among other conditions, an equitable share of the benefits accruing from these agreements
would benefit to consumers. TFEU, supra note 6, at art. 101. That precision limits considerably the possibility
for European antitrust authorities to determine, on an autonomous basis, what conditions should be satisfied for
an exemption to be granted on the basis of that provision.
20. For example, telecommunications, energy distribution, water supply, or automatic transportation.
Given the high investment requested, these industries are often considered to induce natural monopoly
situations. See supra note 3. For an overview applicable to these industries in the European Union, see generally
2001 O.J. (C 17/04). Report to the Laeken European Council: Services of General Interest, COM (2001) 598
final (Oct. 17, 2001); Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions, COM (2007) 725 final (Nov. 20,
2007).
21. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions, supra note 20. See the three
communications quoted in note 20, particularly the last one. The services encompassing the establishment of a
solidarity are deemed "social services of general interest."

22. See Public Undertakings and Services in the European Union, EUR. PARLIAMENT, pt. niI,
http://www.europarl.europa.eulworkingpapers/econ/w2 I/sum-2_en.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2012).
23. Id. On the rules applicable to public undertakings within the European Union, see JOSE Luls
BUENDIA SIERRA, EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS AND STATE MONOPOLlES UNDER EC LAW: ARTICLE 86 (FORMERLY
ARTICLE 90) OF THE EC TREATY 29-43 (2000); ERIKA SZYSZCAK, THE REGULATION OF THE STATE IN
COMPETITIVE MARKETS INTHE EU 111-18 (2007).
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administrations or through undertakings they controlled, they did not have to
adopt formal rules dictating conduct to the persons in charge of implementing the
objectives assigned to them. In most instances, the intent of the authority could
be expressed informally through individual contacts between the Minister in
24
charge and the directors of the public administration or undertaking.
D.

The Remaining Tool

In the last decade, there has been a general movement to progressively
reduce to regulation the variety of tools available to public authorities." The idea
behind the movement is that authorities and markets should do what they are
there for-that is, for markets, to carry out economic activities and, for
authorities, to regulate these activities where appropriate.26
This movement has been observed in various countries. In Europe, some
activities traditionally carried out by authorities have been submitted to
competition courts. That move has been decided by the Court of Justice of the
European Union ("Court")." In landmark judgments, the Court decided that
competition should extend to activities as diverse as: the management of supply
and demand on the labour market;28 the provision of telecommunication services,
networks, and terminals; 29 and the provision of non-urgent transportation for

24.
25.

See Public Undertakings and Services in the European Union Economic Series W-21, supra note 22.
Id.

26.

See generally TONY PROSSER, THE LIMITS OF COMPETITION LAW: MARKETS AND PUBLIC SERVICES

4 (2005).
27. That denomination has been introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Communities, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C
306) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon]. Formerly, the same Court was called "Court of Justice of the European
Communities." Id. at art. 1(A)(8). The Court is the higher judicial instance within the European Union for all
matters covered by the Treaty. A. - Treaty on the European Union, CURIA, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/
docs/application/pdf/2009-ll/enextrait cour 2009-11-30 l1-32-32_981.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2012). In
substance, its intervention may occur in three sorts of circumstances. First, direct applications may be submitted
to the Court by Member States and/or other European institutions where they feel that European law has been
infringed by another Member State and/or European institution. Id. Second, an appeal can be formed against
judgments issued by the General Court, which is a lower European jurisdiction where applications by firms and
individuals may be brought. Id. Third, the Court may act upon request by a national court on European matters
either to interpret European law or to decide on the validity of a European instrument. Id. For general
information, see the Court's website at The Court of Justice of the European Union, EUR. UNION,
http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice/indexen.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2012). See
generally HENRY G. SCHERMERS & DENIS F. WAELBROECK, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

(6th ed. 2001); TAKIS TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW (2nd ed. 2007); ALEXANDER H. TORK,
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN EU LAW (2009).

28. Case C-41/90, Hofner & Elser v. Macrotron GmbH, 1991 E.C.R. 1-1979.
29. Case 311/84, Centre Beige d'6tudes de March6 - T616marketing (CBEM) SA v. Compagnie
Luxembourgeoise de T616diffusion, 1985 E.C.R. 3261; Case C- 18/88, Rdgie des T616graphes et des T616phones
(RTT) v. GB-Inno-BM SA, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5973; Case C-202/88, France v. Comm'n, 1991 E.C.R. 1-1259;
Joined Cases C-271/90, C-281/90, C-289/90, Spain v. Comm'n, 1992 E.C.R. I-5859.

431

2012 / The Roles Devoted to Markets andAuthorities in Times of Crisis
patients.o For decades prior to those landmark judgments, all of the activities just
mentioned had been submitted to derogatory regimes in the Member States
where the issue originated."
Pursuant to Article 102 of the TFEU, dominant firms are prohibited from
abusing their strong market position.32 By definition, firms in a situation of legal
monopoly are the only ones active on a given market. Under case law, that
situation implies that their position on the market can be deemed "dominant."
These firms being considered dominant, the prohibition contained in the
provision applies and these firms must refrain from any behaviour which, under
the case law, may be considered as "abusive." In a celebrated evolution, the
Court has progressively considered in the course of time that, in essence, legal
monopolies necessarily abuse their dominant position because, as shown by
economic literature, monopolies are, by themselves, conducive to price increases
and/or output limitations.
This evolution has paved the way for the European Commission, and later
the European Parliament and Council, to adopt regulations opening to new
entrants markets traditionally reserved by Member States for their national
monopolies." That progressive opening of national markets has been labelled
"liberalisation," as it entails the possibility for firms previously barred from
carrying out a given activity to henceforth enter these markets.
Liberalisation has complicated the exercise of economic activities by
administrations and/or public undertakings. As markets were opened to new
entrants, these entities suddenly faced intense competition from private firms that
36
were generally very efficient.
- For decades, public undertakings had been provided special and exclusive
rights very useful for the exercise of their activities-with liberalisation,

30. Case C-475/99, Ambulanz Gltickner v. Landkreis Sidwestpfalz, 2001 E.C.R. 1-8137.
31. See generally D.G. GOYDER, E.C. COMPETITION LAW (4th ed. 2003).
32. TFEU, supra note 6, at art. 102.
33. See Case C-41/90, Hofner & Elser v. Macrotron GmbH, 1991 E.C.R. 1-1979; see also Case C179/90, Merci Convenzionali Porto di Genova Spa v. Siderurgica Gabrielli SpA, 1991 E.C.R. 1-05889.
34. Restraints on predatory pricing, barred by TFEU Article 102 provide just one example. See also E.C.
COMPETITION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW, supra note 13. Within the European Union, the European
Commission has, as its task, the preparation of draft legislation for discussion and adoption by, and with, the
European Parliament and the Council, whereas the two latter institutions together hold legislative power.
European Commission, EUROPA, http://europa.eulabout-eu/institutions-bodies/european-commissionlindex
en.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2012).
35. For a reference to this nomenclature see, e.g., General Agreement on Trade in Services, WORLD
TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.orglenglish/docs-elegal-e/26-gats 01_e.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2012).
36. These firms were those successful enough in their markets of origin to obtain the resources necessary
for entry into liberalised markets. The economic theory of monopoly itself assumes the monopolist's position is not
challenged by new entrants, either actual or potential. See ROGER J. VAN DEN BERGH & PETER D. CAMESASCA,
EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 23-24 (2d ed. 2006).

432

Global Business & Development Law Journal/ Vol. 25
these privileges could not be maintained."
- They had long been accustomed to receiving public subsidies very useful
to cover their debt-liberalisation forced them to rely on their own forces
to finance their activities and investment.38
- Above all, they had been considered, by governments, for many years, as
a convenient way to fight unemployment-as a result of liberalisation,
their personnel, not always qualified, was measured against people
selected by rival companies for their professional competence and their
appetite for excellent economic results.39
II. THAT WHICH OUGHT NOT BE DONE 40
A.

"No Regulation"

At the end of the process described above, regulation remains the main-if
not the only-tool available for action by authorities on markets.
Within the realm of regulation, the most common type of measure one thinks
of is that where authorities prohibit a certain behavior. 4' In this type of constraint,
the regulating authority states "that which ought not be done." The actors that are
subject to the regulation are warned that, if they adopt the target behavior, they
will be subjected to sanction of some kind. 42 By way of anticipation, they tend to
avoid the target behavior.43 If they are unaware of the constraint, or if they are

37. See generally SIERRA, supra note 23.
38. In the European Union, Member States are prohibited, in principle, from providing subsidies to
undertakings. That prohibition is based on the necessity to avoid each Member State supporting with the public
budget their own undertakings against firms established in other Member States. Allowing State subsidies
would have given rise to frontal competition among the Member States. Instead of that form of competition, the
Founders of the Union have opted for a progressive integration of national economies. On this subject matter,
see generally KELYN BACON, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW OF STATE AID (2009); see also generally THE LAW
OF STATE AID IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (Andrea Biondi et al. eds., 2004); see also generally CONOR QUIGLEY
Q.C., EUROPEAN STATE AID LAW AND POLICY (2d ed. 2009).
39. See Liberalisation, EUR. COMM'N COMPETITION, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/liberalisation/
overview_en.html (last updated Mar. 19, 2012).
40. On regulation in general, see sources cited supra note 1.
41. This can be thought of as essentially a dichotomy in terms of preventive of, and deterrent of, certain
behaviors, as exemplified by regulation through agencies (preventive) and through litigation (deterrent). See
generally Richard A. Posner, Regulation (Agencies) Versus Litigation (Courts): An Analytical Framework, in
REGULATION VERSUS LITIGATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS AND LAW 11 (Daniel P. Kessler ed.,
2011).
42. See id.
43. The underlying principle is one of a cost/benefit analysis. In the criminal context, for example,
economic analysis of deterrence begins with the premise that the "potential offenders will be deterred from
criminal acts if the expected costs of those acts exceed their expected benefits." Christine Jolls, Cass R.
Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS 13, 45 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). But where the actor in question is a corporate entity, the
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aware of it but do not respect it, they expose themselves to the imposition of
sanction. It is supposed that the experience of the sanction should permit the
actors to avoid any repetition of the sanctioned behavior. 4
B. Remuneration
Remuneration is one contentious place where regulation based on an
incentive/deterrent model may be exemplified. A situation in recent memory
involved the European financial institution called Fortis. The turmoil surrounding
Fortis was intimately related to a strategy of expansion carried out by the CEO of
that financial institution-Mr. JP Votron.45 Mr. Votron was originally working in
a leading position for a Dutch based financial institution, ABN-Amro,46 when he
was contacted by Fortis, another financial institution with a Belgian origin and a
European dimension, for the purpose of offering Mr. Votron the job of CEO at
Fortis.
Mr. Votron accepted the offer, with an ambitious plan for growth of Fortisi'
As part of that strategy, the latter attempted to acquire, with the assistance of
business partners, the former employer of Mr. Votron, ABN-Amro. The project
first encountered competition by a rival bid from Barclays, another leading
financial institution. However, the Fortis bid succeeded when these directors

analysis is undoubtedly more complicated, although the fundamental starting point remains unchanged. See
generally THOMAS J. MICELI, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 315 (2d ed. 2009).
44. In E.U. competition law, the amount of fines for engaging in market distortion can be doubled by
taking recidivism into account. See VALENTINE KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION LAW
AND PRACTICE 38 (9th ed. 2007).
45. For a chronology, see Julia Werdigier, Fortis Shareholders Back ABN Amro Bid, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
7, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/07/business/worldbusiness/07bank.html; see Bloomberg News,
Consortium Wins Control of ABN Amro, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/09/
business/worldbusiness/09bank.html; see Julia Werdigier, In Europe, One Bank Chief Steps Down, and Another
May Follow, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2008, at C7, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/12/
business/worldbusiness/12fortis.html; see Landon Thomas, Jr. & Matthew Saltmarsh, European Regulators
Move Swiftly to Rescue Two Lenders, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2008, at C2, available at http://query.
see Carter Dougherty,
nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9507E7DA133CF93AA1575ACOA96E9C8B63;
Authorities Aid Banks in Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2008, at Cl http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/30/
business/worldbusiness/30euro.html. For a post-debacle analysis, see Managing Banks: It Wasn't Me,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 2009, at 56, available at http://www.economist. com/node/14587120; Aftermath of a
Mega-Merger: Three Amigos, Only One Conquistador, ECONOMIST, July 17, 2008, at 56, available at
http://www.economist.cominode/1 1751202.
46. Harry Wilson, Philip Aldrick & Kamal Ahmed, RBS Investigation: Chapter 2 - the ABN Amro
Takeover, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 11, 2011, 9:45 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/
banksandfinance/8947530/RBS-investigation-Chapter-2-the-ABN-Amro-takeover.html.
47. See Lloyds 'In Talks Over Merger for SWIP', SCOTSMAN, Nov. 11, 2005, at 1, available at
http://www.scotsman.com/business/banking/lloyds-intalks-over..mergerjfor-swip_1965748.
48. See ABN Bid Battle 'Could go Hostile', BBC NEWS (Apr. 15, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
business/6557845.stm.
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were offered an attractive financial package and the initial bid was considerably
.49
increased.
The deal being done, Mr. Votron received a notable increase of his salary by
way of a bonus. In substance, that bonus was based on the idea that the recently
made acquisitions, particularly the acquisition of ABN-Amro, had conferred to
Fortis another dimension which should be reflected in Mr. Votron's salary.o
In the increasingly declining global economic context in which the
acquisition had taken place, Fortis, like many other financial institutions, became
the subject of hesitant investment. The value of Fortis' shares declined," creating
a situation where the bank needed fresh capital to finance its investments. That
fresh capital was obtained through capital increases52 which diluted the value of
the former shares, raised discontent among the loyal shareholders, and further
fueled questions about management's control of the situation.5 4
Rapidly, market confidence in other Belgian financial institutions declined,
leading to a situation where, for the first time in nearly a century,5 and with the
approval of the European Commission, the Belgian Government had to bail out
many banks operating on the national territory"-thereby increasing Belgian
national debt to a dangerous level."

49. RBS Woos ABN with 149bn Bid Plan, BBC NEWS (Apr. 25, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hil
business/6590741.stm.
50. See Belgian Banks Reveal Big Bonuses, FLANDERS TODAY (Apr. 7, 2009), http://www.
flanderstoday.eu/content/belgian-banks-reveal-big-bonuses.
51. Gilbert Kreijger, ABN Shares Fall on Fortis Financing Worries: Analysts, REUTERS (Aug. 10, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/08/1 1/businesspro-abnamro-takeover-shares-dc-idUSAAT
PM),
2:41
00705220070811.
52. David Gow, Shareholder Anger Could Force Out Fortis Boss, GUARDIAN (July 10, 2008),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/jul/1 1/banking.
53. Martin van der Starre, Fortis Ousts Chief Votron After ABN Amro Deal Depletes Capital,
BLOOMBERG (July 11, 2008), http://www.bloomberg. com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&refer-europe
&sid=aSgzfhmCOLSU.
54. See Gow, supra note 52.
55. See Alex J. Pollock, There's Usually a Banking Crisis Somewhere!, AMERICAN (Sept. 21, 2011)
http://www.american.com/archive/201 1/september/theres-usually-a-banking-crisis-somewhere.
56. Press Release, State Aid: Commission Temporarily Approves Rescue Aid for Dexia Bank Belgium;
Opens In-Depth Investigation (Oct. 17, 2011), available at http://www.deljpn.ec.europa.eu/modules/
media/news/2011/11 101b.html?mllang=en.
57. Michael Birnbaum, France, Belgium Agree to Nationalize Troubled Dexia Bank, WASH. POST (Oct.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/merkel-sarkozy-reach-agreement-on-banking2011),
9,
Aoife White, European Bank Giant Fortis Partially
sector/2011/10/09/gIQADOV7XL-story.htmi;
Nationalized, USA TODAY (Sept. 29, 2008, 8:50 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/
banking/2008-09-28-fortis-bankN.htm.
58. Phillip Inman, Belgium Joins Financial Markets' Hit List, GUARDIAN (Nov. 24, 2010),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/24/belgium-financial-markets-hit-list/print. For a historical analysis
of the relations between bad debt and the existence of states, see generally MICHAEL ToMZ, REPUTATION AND
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: SOVEREIGN DEBT ACROSS THREE CENTURIES (2007).
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C. Lesson
In the absence of compensation regulation (a form of "No regulation"),
companies may adopt incentive structures which would have undesirable
economic consequences for the society." In the example of Fortis, it is possible
that forms of regulation both internal and external to Fortis may have been able
to limit the deleterious and widespread consequences of management decisions
that have been linked to those consequences. Such regulatory measures might
include caps on remuneration or evaluation of investment decisions with a longterm, forward-looking measurement tool, such that only those investment
decisions which prove profitable over a period of, say, more than 18 months, be
rewarded with increased remuneration. An external tool might include
government regulation of salaries, but this may be viewed as unpopular and too
intrusive to the internal operation of businesses.
III. THAT WHICH OUGHT TO BE DONE
A. "Yes Regulation"
In a complimentary manner, regulation can also say "that which ouglt to be
done." In this case, the authority intervenes through the enactment of rules where
it wants a specific behavior to be adopted and in a context where, according to
information available to it, the target behavior would not be adopted in the
absence of such a regulation.
B. Example
An illustration of this sort of regulation can be taken from the strategy used
by certain distance contract firms to attract clients. In most instances, clients
purchase products they see in shops. The situation may be slightly different for
services, which cannot be seen. However, the tendency, until recently in Europe,
was to purchase services from professionals known by the client or working in a
firm with which the client had already dealt.6 Physical contact is deemed
important by many consumers as it allows them to verify, before making a

59. As regards the European Union, see Communication from the Commission Accompanying
Commission Recommendation Complementing Recommendations 2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC as Regards
the Regime for the Remuneration of Directors of Listed Companies and Commission Recommendation on
Remuneration Policies in the Financial Services Sector, at 2, COM (2009) 211 final (Apr. 30, 2009); see also
Commission Recommendation on Remuneration Policies in the Financial Services Sector, at 2, SEC (2009)
580, 581 (Apr. 30, 2009); see also 2009 O.J. (L 120) 28 para. 7.
60. Rodoula H. Tsiotsou & Jochen Wirtz, Consumer Behavior in a Service Context, in HANDBOOK OF
NEW DEVELOPMENTS INCONSUMER BEHAVIOR 53 (Victoria Wells & Gordon Foxall eds., forthcoming June
2012).
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purchase, whether the products are those which they really want to buy, or
whether the services will be delivered in an appropriate way, given the reputation
of the professional, or the services already performed by him/her.
Recently, firms have sought to develop contacts with clients at a distance."
They realized they could benefit from the fact that clients do not always want to
go to a shop or an atelier to purchase products or services. In the context of these
"distance contracts," transactions were concluded. That tendency grew
dramatically with the development of electronic communications techniques. To
a certain extent, it has now become the standard. The physical contact has been
replaced, in most cases, by information gathered on the Internet.
In some instances, "distance contracts" appeared not to satisfy all consumers
completely. One of the reasons was that consumers were at times buying
products that differed from those they really wanted. On the basis of pictures
placed on the Internet, or available in a brochure, they purchased, say, towels
which, as it appeared when they finally held them in their hands, did not exactly
correspond to what they needed.62
In some instances, the absence of correspondence resulted from a
misunderstanding between the firm and its clients. Using the towel example,
above, the firm had genuinely proposed specific towels but the message had not
come across perfectly because the clients had not seen or touched the products. In
other instances, the non-correspondence could hardly be deemed fortuitous.
Although intent is always difficult to establish, the firm had probably sought to
lure consumers with the expectation that the latter would accept the product or
the service despite their relative discontent with what they in fact obtained in
contrast to the relative contentment they might have felt had they gotten what
they believed they were going to obtain.
C. Lesson
These difficulties have been reported to authorities, which have introduced
regulation to avoid such situations. Some of these rules are based on the idea that,
absent a regulation of these practices, firms seeking to conclude distance
contracts may not always supply clients with the information necessary to make
an informed decision. They, thus, specify the information that should be provided
by such firms. They also provide a kind of sanction, by which the consumer may

61. See, e.g., Life Insurance Purchasing Habits Changing as One in Four Consumers Now Prefer to Buy
Direct, LIFE (July 27, 2011), http://www.lifehappens.org/life-insurance-purchasing-habits-changing-as-one-infour-consumers-now-prefer-to-buy-direct/.
62. Or, as far as services are concerned, they purchased a holiday trip in a fancy village but, when they
arrived at the destination, the facilities were not as comfortable as they had thought based on, again, the pictures
that had been presented. See, e.g., Expedia-Vacation Packages, CONSUMER AFF. (Jan. 31, 2012),
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/travel/expediapackages.html.
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withdraw from the contract, at no cost to the consumer, in the case where the
information has not been properly provided.63
IV. THE CONCEPT OF CONSTRAINT
A.

"Yes-No," "No-Yes"

In the previous section, we divided regulation into categories depending on
whether it compels ("yes regulation") or prohibits ("no regulation") a specific
behavior. The reader has probably noticed that these categories overlap to a
certain extent. Rather than referring to different sorts of regulations, they provide
a different way to formulate, or interpret, a rule.
Take the regulation identifying information to be provided by firms engaged
in distance contracts. As I have proposed above, that regulation can be associated
with the second category to the extent firms are compelled, as a result of the
existence of that rule, to adopt certain behavior (provide the requested
information, "yes-regulation")."4 But an analysis using the standard provided in
the first category is also possible. The obligation to provide specific information
can also be formulated, and/or interpreted as coming down to a prohibition to
provide insufficient or erroneous information ("no regulation").
Ultimately, the core of regulation does not really depend on how the rule is
formulated, but rather on the constraint imposed upon the behavior of those to
whom the regulation is addressed. Firms would have acted in a given way-but
are prevented from doing so as a result of the existence of regulation.
Alternatively, firms wanting to avoid a specific situation or behavior will have to
adopt that behavior because the regulation so prescribes. In both cases, because
they introduce constraints into an otherwise freely operating system, the
regulations limit the possibilities that would otherwise be open to businesses.
B. Public Constraintv. PrivateFreedom
Is the introduction of such a constraint specific to regulation? I suspect this
question plays a central role in the dilemma posed at the outset of this article,
where I raised the question of whether the crisis should be solved by markets or

63. The following instruments are applicable to distance contracts within the European Union. See
Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the Protection of
Consumers in Respect of Distance Contracts, 1997 O.J. (L 144) art. 6; see also Directive 2002/65/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 Concerning the Distance Marketing of
Consumer Financial Services and Amending Council Directive 90/619/EEC and Directives 97/7/EC and
98/27/EC, 2002 O.J. (L 271) 16-24; see also Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the
Information Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10-19.
64. See supra Part IU.A.
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by authorities. Should markets be let free to react spontaneously to these
challenges? Or should constraints be imposed on them by authorities-with the
consequence that businesses will then be constrained in their reactions?
In these factual situations, constraints are associated with governmental
authorities and are necessarily public in nature. By contrast, freedom is presented
as being inherent to markets. An opposition is thus established between public
constraints and private freedom.
That opposition induces me to formulate two subordinate questions. First,
can authorities create freedom for markets? Second, can markets be, in various
situations, a source of constraint? In other words, do markets at times curb the
energy of businesses, their willingness and desire to engage in projects, their
capacity to innovate, or their readiness to create wealth for themselves and
others?
C. ConstraintsResulting from Market Dominance
The discussion below concentrates on the second question. One example
which readily comes to mind, particularly to the mind of a scholar with a definite
interest in antitrust law, is the constraints which are carried out by dominant
firms in the markets placed under their domination. Under European competition
law,6 Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
("TFEU")" prohibits abuses committed by dominant firms. The application of
the prohibition depends upon a showing that (a) a firm dominates a market, (b) it
has made an abusive use of that domination, and (c) the behavior involved in that
abuse cannot be justified by a legitimate objective. The first condition, and thus
the existence of domination, is deemed established where four additional criteria
are met.
First, a showing of dominance requires a demonstration that the firm in
question appears as a mandatory partner for clients in the market.6 " Clients have
no choice but to deal with the firm. This is because, for instance, the firm
controls a material necessary for the manufacture of a given product or because
the firm controls a distribution network essential to channel products or services
to consumers.

65. I refer, in the lines ahead, to European competition law, but the demonstration could also be made
with reference to U.S. antitrust law. On the similarities and differences between them, see the references
provided supra note 1.
66. TFEU, supra note 6, at art. 102 (Formerly Article 82 TEC).
67. See, e.g., Commission Decision 89/205, art. 80, 1989 OJ. (L 78) 1. Additional conditions for the
application of the prohibition are that the domination must extend on a substantial part of the common market
and the abuse must affect interstate commerce. Before examining whether all conditions are satisfied, courts
and authorities must define the relevant market.
68. See, e.g., id. (for an early case articulating this principle).
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Second, the plaintiff in a legal action or competition authorities acting sua
sponte must establish that, in the context of the case, the firm has the capacity to
determine the conditions under which its products and services are made
available to clients.69 In normal, competitive markets, strategies are defined by
firms taking into account the possible reactions of competitors and the likely
attitude of consumers. In a dominated market, that pattern ceases to exist. As a
result of various factors, the firm appears as being in a position where it can
determine these market conditions without even considering what consumers or
competitors would do.
Third, it must be demonstrated that the firm is capable of imposing its trading
conditions on other undertakings present in the same market.70 In normal markets,
each firm would decide its strategy-taking into account consumers and
competitors as indicated above. In a dominated market, that relative autonomy or
independence of market players has ceased to exist. For a variety of reasons,
these actors must adapt themselves to the market conditions decided by the
dominant firm.
Finally, plaintiffs and/or authorities must establish that, as a result of its
position, the firm has the capacity to hinder, or even eliminate, competitors and
competition." Normally, firms do not have the power to affect, by their own
transactions, the structure of the market. Such an effect is possible, by contrast, in
a dominated market, the dominant firm having for instance the capacity to oust a
competitor from a market through predatory pricing, or the capacity to squeeze a
distributor by charging the latter for supply, a price superior to the final price
proposed to consumers.
Where these conditions and criteria are met, the firm is deemed dominant. As
appears from the criteria above, dominance involves the imposition of constraints
on consumers and competitors. By virtue of its dominance, the firm has the
ability to impose market conditions on the latter and the former. It has the power
to prevent entry of potential competitors and to oust actual ones-thereby
constraining them in their business projects. It has the capacity to compel
consumers and partners to deal with it, despite its possible shortcomings.
D. ConstraintsInherent in Business Behavior 72
The existence of constraints imposed by private actors are not limited to a
specific category of situations-those where a market is dominated by a firm.

69. Id. at art. 23.
70. Id. at art. 22.
71. Id.
72.
On this subject, see Paul Nihoul, From Unfair Trading to Free Competition-Towards a New
Organisationof Markets in the European Union, 17 EUR. BUS. L. REv. 23 (2006).
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They appear to be inherent to market transactions. Constraints are created by
markets and businesses in just about every situation.
One such situation is where enterprises, acting in an individual capacity,
create their own rules. Such rules may concern consumers. For example,
businesses make transactions with their customers subject to the latter agreeing
with their general sales conditions. These general conditions may require
advance payments while customers would probably prefer to retain payment until
the product has been received-and to the extent they are satisfied. Businesses
may compel clients to use specific products in conjunction with their own, where
customers may well have chosen others.
These obligations can be analyzed as constraints with a private origin. They
are not, by far, limited to customers or clients. Constraints are ubiquitous in the
relationship between enterprises and their labor force. Firms typically request
personnel to start their service at a certain time, to dress in a certain way, to
behave with clients in a given manner.
The same can be stated about firms in relation to their suppliers. Generally,
the former dictate conditions applicable to the supplies to be provided by the
latter-if the latter want to continue being designated as suppliers.
E. ConstraintsImposed by Professionalor IndustrialAssociations
Constraints also come from professional or industrial associations to which
firms belong. Firms normally find an interest in participating in these
associations or organizations.74 But the counterpart for these advantages is that
they must abide by the rules imposed by the same. The rules may require
members adhere to certain technical specifications with respect to their products.
They may prohibit members from taking a public stance on issues where the
association or the organization wants to develop a common point of view, for
example.

73. Associations exist in the majority of professional sectors. They have for their objective the
organization of the profession and the promotion of its interest, often in the form of a governmental lobby, or
"special interest" group. Associations may engage in decision-making which can run afoul of TFEU Article 101
when those decisions are viewed as "agreements" or "concerted practices." See GOYDER, supra note 31, at 67,
68,79-81.
74. Toni Klym McLellan, Joining Trade Associations, BUSINESS, www.business.com/guides/joiningtrade-associations-362 (last visited Mar. 27, 2012). For instance, they receive benefits in the form of collective
supply. Or they receive intelligence on market trends. Or they gain influence on the public policy carried out in
the sector to which they belong.
75. Governance documents-including Articles of Incorporation, Bylaws, and Policy Manuals-play a
key role in delimiting the character of the association and may therefore proscribe activities carried out by the
association's members. ASSOCIATIONS AND THE LAW 100-01 (Jerald A. Jacobs ed., 2002). The constraints
imposed by trade or professional associations sometimes infringe rules of competition. On this topic, see inter
alia Trade Associations, Professions and Self-Regulating Bodies: Understanding Competition Law, OFF. FAIR
TRADING 19-20 (Dec. 2004), http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared-oft/business-leaflets/ca98_guidelines/oft408.pdf.
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F. ConstraintsDerivingfrom Market Interactions
Beyond these specific examples, business transactions involve, in
themselves, the imposition of a degree of constraints on partners and competitors.
Consider "bundling" or "tying" arrangements, whereby the supply of one product
is made dependent upon the acceptation of another one. For instance, iPhones
have been distributed in Europe and the United States by telecom operators. In
exchange for payments, these operators were granted a right to sell iPhones in
exclusivity in a given territory. These payments were amortized through selling
to iPhones purchasers subscriptions to mobile services provided by these
operators. The situation, for clients, was rather constraining-they had to
purchase a subscription with a given operator, which they possibly disliked, in
order to obtain one of these famous iPhones.
As a result of the very existence of the constraint imposed by that practice on
customers, bundling has been prohibited in some countries." Through that
prohibition, authorities wanted to protect consumers from purchasing products or
services they did not really want.7 ' Another reason could be to protect smaller
businesses." Bundling can more easily be carried out by firms with a significant
turnover.w For instance, the right to distribute iPhones could only be obtained by
the major telecom operators."' The smaller ones did not have the financial
capability to make the payments requested by Apple-the manufacturer of
iPhones. 2
In that type of country, bundling would thus be prohibited in all
circumstances. A violation of that prohibition would be prosecuted as an
administrative matter and give rise to a sanction (imposition of a fine)." The
purpose of the sanction would be to announce that sanctions will be imposed
whenever the prohibition is infringed.

76. iPhone Q&A - Revised November 20, 2011, EVERYIPHONE (Nov. 20, 2011), www.everymac.com/
systems/appleliphone/iphone-faqliphone-carrier-exclusivity-buying-unlocked-iphone.html; At Midnight, The
First Sale in Vinius, the iPhone 3G (Video, Photos), LRYTAS.LT (Sept. 26, 2008), www.1rytas.It/12224184741
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-pl-it-vidurnakt -vilniuje-parduoti-pirmieji-iphone-3g-video-nuotraukos.htm;

Samuel

Fields, Confirmado, el iPhone Llegard a Espaia de la mano de Movistar, APPLESFERA (June 4, 2008),
www.applesfera.com/apple/confirmado-el-iphone-llegara-a-espana-de-la-mano-de-movistar.
77. THE UNILATERAL CONDUCT WORKING GRP., REPORT ON TYING AND BUNDLED DISCOUNTING 5, 6,
19, 23 (2009), available at www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc356.pdf.
78.

79.
80.
81.
get access
82.

Id. at 9-10, 19.

Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
iPhone Q&A - Revised November 20, 2011, supra note 76 (noting that only Cingular/AT&T could
to the iPhone).
Id.

83. See THE UNILATERAL CONDUCT WORKING GRP., supra note 77, at 19 (noting enforcement by
groups like the Israel Antitrust Authority, the Turkish Competition Authority, The Russian Federal
Antimonopoly Service, and the United Kingdom's Office of Fair Trading).
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Bundling, however, is not prohibited in all countries; it is accepted in some.
Where it is accepted, sellers are left unhindered in regards to their business
practices-and consumers are deemed responsible enough not to purchase
products they do not want. If the practice is not appreciated by consumers, sellers
will have to face the consequences: lower sales, lower market share, lower
profits, and lower share value.

COMPARISON

REGULATED
MARKETS

FREE MARKETS

Tying

Tying is prohibited by
regulation.

Tying is not prohibited There is a difference
by regulation but may between the two
be disliked by business scenarios as one involves
regulation and the other
partners.
does not.

Penalties for tying

A fine is imposed by a
court, an authority or a
legislator. As a result of
the fine, the profit made
by the perpetrator is
lower than anticipated.

No fine is imposed by
a court or authority but firms resorting to
that practice face the
risk that dissatisfied
customers turn to other
suppliers. Such firms
would then lose
revenues. Their profits
would be lower than
anticipated.

In both situations, the
firm suffers a financial
loss-as a result of a fine
in one case (regulation)
or as a result of negative
reactions by dissatisfied
business partners in the
other (markets).

84. See End of Bundling Ban In Sight, FLANDERS TODAY (Apr. 28, 2009), http://www.flanderstoday.eu/
content/end-bundling-ban-sight.
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Goals

The hope of the
legislator, the regulator,
and/or the court is that
tying will be dropped by
infringing firms, as these
firms undergo a
sanction.

The lesson for such
firms is to stop
resorting to tying in
similar contexts as
they would otherwise
be sanctioned by
dissatisfied partners.

In both situations, the
firm will avoid engaging
again in that practice for
fear of a sanction being
imposed again-a fine in
one case (regulation) and
a business sanction in the
other (markets).

Long-term policy
objectives

The legislator, the
regulator and/or the
court anticipates that the
firm will renounce ever
resorting to tying in
order to avoid future
sanctions.

In the longer term, the
lesson is that firms
should anticipate
possible discontent on
the part of customers if
they want to avoid
losses in revenues.

In both situations, other
firms are warned to
anticipate possible
sanctions and should
avoid engaging in the
questioned behavior.

V. CONCLUSION: THE NATURE OF THE DEBATE

A. Common Feature
This Article started with an interrogation as to who should be entrusted with
the task of addressing the challenges attached to the current crisis-authorities or
markets. In the course of the discussion, it appeared that public interventions are
sometimes criticized because they involve the imposition of constraints on
businesses which would otherwise be free. That critique is right to the extent that
regulation indeed produces constraints.
However, as demonstrated above, public authorities are not the only ones to
introduce constraints. Constraints are also produced by markets. An analysis of
business practices demonstrates that constraints derive, for instance, from the
power exercised by dominant firms. For the members involved, those constraints
may derive from the participation in professional or industrial associations or
organisations. More generally, those constraints may derive from the mere
exercise of activities by firms, as the latter organize their labor force, their
contacts with suppliers, and their relations with customers. Finally, such
constraints may derive from the very existence of business operations as firms
enter into relationships with certain partners and in opposition to competitors or
from their customer base.
Markets and authorities thus have one feature in common when it comes to
regulation-their actions involve the imposition of constraints on business actors.
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B. What Degree?
In such a context, an opposition between markets and authorities does not
really make sense. If there is any, the opposition is not between a state of private
freedom and one of public constraint. If one opposition were to be mentioned, it
would be between a state of freedom and one of constraint-knowing that
constraints may be produced by a variety of actors.
Yet, that formulation of the dilemma immediately appears as it plainly is
unrealistic. If market freedom is defined as the possibility for market actors to
adopt whatever act they want or to engage in whatever project they desire
without being subject to any constraint whatsoever, one would have to consider
that freedom does not really exist in markets. So defined, it is an impossibility
because no market action is possible without some kind of constraint.
A more realistic approach would consist of accepting that business activities
entail the imposition and the acceptation of a certain degree of constraint-the
question being, then, not any longer whether a pure state of freedom can be
attained, but rather what degree of freedom, or conversely, what degree of
constraint, is desirable.
C. What Issue?
As markets and authorities have in common the imposition of constraints on
businesses, another problem is whether it is legitimate to express a systematic
preference, ex ante, for one or the other when it comes to selecting who should
address the financial crisis.
Again a reasonable attitude would be to consider that the answer is probably
not the same in all contexts. Rather than asking the question of the preference for
markets or authorities once and for all, we should examine, as it pertains to each
issue, who is in the best position and has the best tools to address the problem.
Markets should not be deemed per se incapable of reaching a goal of public
interest. As a corollary, authorities should not be deemed per se incompetent to
realize a given regulatory task.
D. Situation, Position
Ultimately, there are situations in which firms and/or individuals may benefit
from a public intervention and there are situations in which, by contrast, they
may lose out as a result of such an intervention.
In essence, the preference of individuals and entities depends on the
advantages or inconveniences that may result from a situation or event. There is
little doubt that customers and competitors will request public interventions
where unacceptable business constraints are imposed on them by partners and/or
competitors. That sort of scenario explains much of the private litigation pending
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before courts. Customers sue suppliers where they deem abusive clauses imposed
by the latter." Competitors sue dominant firms where, as a result of the power
detained and exercised by the latter, they are not in a position to develop a
sustainable, ambitious business project."
Certainly the answer to the question posed at the outset-markets or
authorities?-reflects something of a Hobson's choice. As has been shown
above, where markets do not self-regulate, the public, through their governments,
will often become implicated, through direct regulatory intervention or by
providing a legislative framework in which individuals or companies may act as
private attorneys' general to effectuate the regulatory end.
An understanding of this basic point is important to avoid becoming lost in
the fog surrounding a debate of this nature. Tackling questions about the proper
form of regulation requires a truly sophisticated analysis, and often the only clear
answer is a relative one that takes into consideration, inter alia, the subject matter
of the regulation, the desired outcome of the regulation, the point of view of the
regulated entity, and the ability of the regulator to achieve desirable ends.
After surveying the architecture of many different types of regulation, we
realize that regulation may be necessary in many instances, but also that it comes
with a price. As such, any serious discussion about how to develop, critique, or
modify this or that regulatory regime for the handling of this or any future crisis
ought to take into consideration not only the desirability of the regulation's
outcome, but also its likelihood of success in achieving the desired outcome,
along with the relative strengths of the parties proposing or opposing the
regulation, and the costs and benefits associated with all of the above.
Decision makers or those involved in the formulation of policy who adhere
without due consideration to absolute government intervention or absolute free
markets necessarily fail to take into consideration the complexities of the market
place and the considerable effects that market activities have on the global
economic system as a whole. Opening the debate from this standpoint will lead to
meaningful discussions about regulation in the coming years, as the world exits,
with new challenges and inventive regulatory tools, from the economic cnsis.

85. See Proposed Class Action Lawsuits Against Lenders for Violating Trial Modification Contracts,
(Oct. 28, 2011), www.mortgage-mod-monster.com/proposed-class-actionMORTGAGE-MOD-MONSTER
lawsuits-lenders-violating-trial-modification-contracts.
86. See Josh Ong, French Reseller Sues Apple Over Unfair Competition, APPLE INSIDER (Dec. 30, 2011,
9:43 PM), http://www.appleinsider.com/articles/1 1/12/30/frenchreseller_sues-apple_over unfairscompetition.
html.
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